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A growing segxiittnt of th« Amsrlcan public dapaads
primarily on network television for news of major national
and international events. However* little research has
been published which addresses itself to the conqpleteness
of the coverage given major events by television news
editors in relation to coverage off<»red by editors of the
printed media. One problem to be esqplored in this study is
to what extent are those individuals yAm rely on network
television offered the major points of information in a
"top-interest* news story as compared to individuals who
read the front page of a major metropolitan newspaper.
The similarity bet%feen a televised newscast and the
front page of a newspaper %#as mentioned recently by
television newsman Walter Cronkite when he described his
own program as "an electronic front page."
There is a growing body of evidence that a signif*
icant segment of the public is dependent on television
news.
Many studies offer comparisons of the media as
Anon.* Tjjaa. October 14* 1966# p. 77.
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2prixaary Bourcas of n^irs. Th@ infer^noos drawn from thes«
ccsaparlaons h«v« be^sn strongly debated. To quote Fuchs*
"It seems that for every release from the Television
Information Office, we receive an equal and opposite set of
2
'empirical* proofs from a newspaper spokasinan* ** The
Jteerican Hewspaper Publishers Association <ANPA) had
disputed the results of the A. C. Heilsen C<»i^pany*s
3
national report on television vimrirvs habits. The AS3PA
was buttressed by the Alfred Polits Media Studies, which
4in turn «Mre discredited by a television research team*
lR>twithstanding the debate that clouds the issue,
certain facts on the growth of television enqphasise the
scope of the problem. For instance, in 1950 thor« were 97
television stations broadcasting to 3.8 ntlllion homes;
today there are 773 stations beamed into 54.8 million
5 This expansion has presented a definite challenge
to the newspapers as primary sources of inforntation.
2
Doucjlaa A. Fuchs, "The Newspaper'-Television Debates
Why It Is Not Telling Us Much. " CQltflBbia JOWgnaliim BttSllSU,*
5, »o. 4 (1966), p. 33.
3
Anon., "AMPA Brands TV's Figures False,"
Anon., "CBS Researchers Hit *Life' Study,
BroadgMting* 71, Mo. 26 (1966), p. 35.
Anon., "The Dimensions of Broadcasting,"
mgaadff^e<^i»^y (1967 Yearbook), p. 3.
*-ar«*;f rf-




3Since 1959 # the opinion research firm of Elmo Roper
and Associates (Roper Research Associates) has compiled
statistics on media usage habits. Commissioned by the
National Association of Broadcasters through its Television
Information Office* the studies have focused on the growing
popularity of television* vis-a-vis radio and the printed
Media. For example* one report indicates that the
percentage of people getting ''most" of their news of world
affairs from television had grown from 51 per cent in 1959
to 64 per cent in 1967. During the same period* the report
continues* those respondents obtaining "most** of their news
from newspapers had shown a slight decrease from 57 to 55
per cent.
On the other hand* the AMPA commissioned a 1967
study by Opinion Research Corporation that determined of
every five respondents on any given day* "four used news*
papers as a news source; three used television as a news
7
source; three used radio as a news source. **
Available literature contains other studies in which
the Roper reports have been faulted. Carter and Greehberg
Burns W. Roper* Emerging FgQfjlea &£. !£&lj^vijsULaQ dCJ^
Qthfix: Haa& Uediais Fublic Attitudaa 19S9-I967 (New Yorks
Television Information Office* 1967)* p. 7.
Anon. « "ANPA Brands TV*s Figures False« **




4ttfl«d Roper's »Qthod in conducting their ofkrn 1964 survey in
Ssn Jose* Cslifornia. There was one najor change*
Although the saoe questions were use<l in many instances*
the respondents %fttre lisdted to one answer only.







Other People «« 4 3
15696 1009&
In a 1961*62 study* Ifestley and Severin sai^led
Wisconsin residents and deterinined that 45 per cent
preferred newspapers as the siost important news source.
Television was preferred hy 31 per cent while 24 per cent
selected radio as their news source. The close correla*
tion of these last t%iro studies suggests that* when limited
to only one choice* more of the public turn to newspapers
than to television as a source of infomiation.
It appears safe here to conclude that network
television is definitely a primary source of world news for
o
R. F, Carter and B. S. Greehberg* "newspapers or
Televisions \«hich Do You Believe?" jQurnaUiiB QlMlgtftJfly* 42
(1965)* p. 29.
9
B. H. Westley and W. J« Sev^rin* "Socne Correlations
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5nany Amerioans and at laast a secondary aource f6r siany
nor«.
Returning to tlH» pr<^I«i& of the extent of coverage
offered by the televiaion networks* Cronkite has said that
the public mMds '*a lot nore (n«i#s) than television can
conaunicate."^^ JSliMr Lower* ^^ Howard K. Smith* ^'^ and
13
Roi>ert Xintner concur and point to responsible daily
newspapers as the needed supplenent.
OQBiparing broadcast and print aedia* John Chancellor
has said, "newspapers try to tranMtdt facts but television
14is the transmission of experience in its rawest fOrm.
"
Tlie advantages offered by television are speed* audio*
visual presentation* and net%fork alliances. Its dis*-
advantages include i (1) the inflexible news hole of the
evening news telecast* and (2) the lack of record for
viewer referral. In addition* it has been argued that the
network news editor needs to "balance ratings* sponsors and
budget on the one hand and the responsibility to inform the
Anon.* Xiiitfit* February 26* 1965* p. 52.
^HlKlBMir lAiwer* "editing for the nation* " IfOCM
BBainftM (1967)* p. 31.
Steward K. Smith* "Television in the Station's
Service*" MILBlI Sj2&fi£±Ufta« 32 (1965)* p. 79.
^^R. fi. Kintner. •Broadcasting and the Mews*"
iUxpflXR* 230 (1965)* pp. 49-55.
14
Anon.* Xiaa* 0ct6ber 14* 1966* p. 75.









puiblic on the oth«r.*
The metropolitan newspaper editor shares ths
responsibility of informing the public. Because of the
newspaper's widespread circulation* the responsibility of
disseminating major national and international news is
emi^asiaed. National and international news* then« are
areas where a study can be conducted that coaqpares news*
papers and television newscasts as sources of information.
Content analysis of the coverage afforded this type of
"topr-interest** news story will provide a basis for studying
the first problem-'-that of extent of coverage offered by
ea^ medium.
The second problem dealt with by this study
concerns the possible effect on television news content of
the use of visual materials. Xn a '*top-'interest ** news
story, does the availability of visual material detract
from reporting the major points of information?
The television industry itself appears divided on
the issue. Eric Sevareid has said that at one tins "an
idea wasn't news because you couldn't put a camera on
16
it.** 8ig Mickelson said* "Sometimes the main theme of a
news story becomes buried in a mass of unrelated pictures
... consequently the news goes one way* the picture the
^^Jack Kinkel* **When the Tail Wags the Dog**
gaturilay Bsatlag^ Harch 12. 1966* p. 140.
Iric 8evaroid. "Politics and the Press*"





s« «Ji -5 s:m . *lf7
"'t-
v-fet'^* ft'
. . .. ."jaQP a«fs»t~ {i^:-**? ^. •'
'
«tt«»iil Mf^ tes «»X:tXXo<^ :'^r*a 9I1S*
•OS .q %(Vd€X; £ .on «X£
It has also b«en argued that sometimes minutes spent
on a filmed feature report* however worthwhile in itself*
will cause hard netws to be omitted or barely touched. In
addition, the economic pressures of a network's investment
in sending a camera team to a story locale may prompt an
editor to use its reports whether or not there is a real
19
story.
On the other hand* a 1963 compilation of various
studies concerning television news practices quotes the
television newsmen interviewckS as being fiinnly convinced
that they present "more honest* unbiased* balanced report"
20ing than do newspapers. **
A definitive answer to the problem of a visual
material effect is difficult to isolate. The content of
any newscast has an intentional supplement of film and
video tape to more forcefully hring the story to the
viewer. But does this supplemental role of visuals expand
to where the use of film takes priority over the full
reporting of an event?
A content analysis of the xMtwork television coverage
17Sig Mickelson* "Growth of Television Hews,
1946-1957." jQurMiiga Quagtgg.Iy> 34, No. 3 (1957), p. 308,
^®Kinkel, Qft. fiit.
20
Jack Lyle and Walter Wilcox, "Television News; An











of a national interest story and of the coverage offered on
the front pages of major metropolitan daily newspapers would
be expected to show a relationship. The analysis could show
a higher* a similar, or a lesser percentage of events
reported by one medium than the other. The relationship
would then be checked to determine what effect the amount
of visual materials employed by television had on the
percentage of events reported by that medium.
Opinions of various leaders in the media and else-
where have been cited accusing television of failing to
fully report major news in deference to the use of visual
materials. Others have denied this. However* all state-
ments that concern this issue share one characteristic—a
lack of supporting en^pirical data. The purpose of this
study was to seek evidence bearing on the problems posed by
these observations.
In summary* the two problems addressed by this study
were (1) the relative extent of coverage given a national
or international news story by the front pages of major
newspapers and by network television* and (2) the relation-
ship between television's use of visual materials and its
reporting of the major points of information of a "top-
interest** news event.
Content analysis was selected as the approach to
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CHAPTER XX
NBmOD
In developing an appropriate method for conparing
the news content of the print and broadcast media* the
first objective was to isolate a major news event that
would fulfill three basic criteria.
The first criterion was that the event should be
national or international in scope to ensure teajor media
interest. Second* the event should have remained a "top^
interest** story over a long enough period of time to show
any trends and to provide a wide base for analysis* inter-
pretation* and conclusions. The third criterion in
selecting the event could be called ''centralisation of the
BMjor source of news." Xf all media representatives are
geographically restricted to one area and given access to
listited sources of news* there should be a high correlation
of observations. A wide geographical separation of
simultaneous occurring events could possibly introduce an
artifact into the study. The news assignment desk might
select the more easily accessible event to cover than
reroute correspondents to the more newsworthy event.
The event selected for analysis in this study was the


















disruption ultimately involved a military coimnitnent by the
United States of some 35 #000 men. The controversial role
played by the United States ensured the international
iaqportance of the story and resulted in coverage by
approximately 300 on->scene correspondents.
iL'he crisis had a clearly defined beginning on
April 24* 1965 « and reauiined a top interest story until a
%iorkable cease-fire agreement was reached 26 days later.
Finally, the crisis was geographically restricted to
the capital city of &anto &omin90 for crisis newsi to
Washington, D. C.# for policy developments in the Uhited
States administration and in the Organization of American
States <OA8) j and to New York City for developments in the
iMited nations.
After the event was selected, a non'-content
historical standard was developed for iise as the basis for
csosy^rison. For this study, 90 major events (J^pendix Z)
,
occurring over the 26-day span, ware isolated for use as
the standard. The events chosen are clearly established
"facts** of history that are stable and stand as constants-*-
dates, names, and specific acts of persons or groups, for
example. The standard was derived from official documents,
reports, articles published in national circulation
magasines, major speecfhes by administration officials, and
personal observations gained through the author's partici-
pation in the crisis as a military public affairs officer.
or
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Ho limit on tlui nuRa:>er o£ facts was set at the start
of r«ssarch. The objective was to establish a concise
historical summary (^pendix II} froia which predominant
facts could be isolated to be used as the basis for
comparing the reporting of the news by the different media.
A second decision %#as made prior to running the
comparison study. In the newspapers to be selected* only
those facts contained in front page stories* or the juoqp
page continuance* would be credited. If the entire
Dominican story was pushed off page one, then that newspaper
would show blank coverage for that day. This arbitrary
procedure was deemed necessary for an effective coniparison
between the time^limited n&wa hole of a television news"
cast and the multi'-paged newspaper.
The newspapers selected for analysis were The Mew
York TjjuUk* Washington £aftL« and Chicago Tribun^^ All were
represented by on-scene staff correspondents and all serve
more than a localised audience. All were available on
microfilm at the Wisconsin Stat© Historical Library.
Of interest are the apparent editorial differences
of the three newspapers. The Timas condemned the United
States intervention in what it described as an internal
affair of the Dominicans. The Pctat was* for the most part*
uncommitted* while the Ty^it>un« hailed the intervention for
preventing a second Comnunist regime in the Caribbean.
In the electronic field the early evening network
iAi^S
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news telecasts were surveyed for the same established
period. All networks were represented in Santo Domingo by
correspondents and camera crews.
Two of the three networks « the Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) and the National Broadcasting Con\pany (HBC) ,
made available, in New York* the original scripts used by
Walter Cronkite and Chet Huntley for the period under
research. In addition* audio tapes or recordings of the
programs were made available to cover the instances when
sound-on-film scripts by on-scene correspondents wers
missing.
The American Broadcasting Company (ABC) did not have
the library system of the other two networks and the only
records available for research were resumes of the evening
news telecasts attached to the news logs of the day. To
ooB^licate matters* four logs for the period under study
were missing. In order to include ABC-TV in the analysis,
two more arbitrary decisions were made. Although ABC
offered a television newscast seven nights a week* the
analysis was limited to the 76 events occurring during the
22 days that scripts were available. Second* since no
better primary source was available* the resumes were given
the same weight as the completely docuirientcd scripts of the
other two networks.
At the time of the crisis* 1965* there were some
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ttvenin9 nmta programs. CBS offored 30 lainutes of "Walter
CronXitti and th« Mwys** five nights a weak with no net%fork
telacast on Saturdays or Sundays. NBC-TV featured the
"Huntley-Brinkley Report" in a 30-minute format and in
addition presented 30 ninutes of the **Saturday Sews Index."
Peter Jennings of ABC'-TV offer<^ a ISnsiinute program five
nights a week and was augmented nationally on both Saturday
and Sunday by 15 minutes of the "Bob Young Report."
However* as surveys cited earlier have shown* a
significant segment of the public depends prxmarily on
network television as their source of news. Therefore the
length and frequency of newscasts becomes irrelevant when
the problem is defined as the maount of information offered
by one medium as compared to another over the duration of a
major news event* in this case the 26**day span of the
OoBiinican crisis.
For this reason the three networks* with the partial
•Mseption of ABC noted earlier* were judged on the extent
to which they reported all the events of the developed
historical standard.
In the research of the networks* news records*
notations were made of the amount of directly*-relatedf
visual material used. The basis for measurement was total
length of time* in minutes and seconds. The purpose was to
check a suggested relationship between the amount of
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Content analysis was used to examine the front pages
of the three selected newspapers and the available network
television news records. The objective was to determine to
What extent the 90 events selected as the historical
standard had been offered to the reader or viewer.
Selection of the 1965 Dominican crisis as the news
story to be studied received support in that it was given
front page placement all 26 days in the Washington £fi|jt« 25
days in The Mew York Xiaft&* snd 24 days in the Chicago
Tribune
. In addition* with the exception of the first day
of the crisis* April 24* the story was used on all net%#ork
early evening newscasts every day of the period under
study.
The collected data are contained in Appendix I. The
results will be presented in two parts corresponding to the
ti#o problems described in Chapter Zt (1) the relative
extent of coverage given an international news story by the
front pages of major newspapers and by network television*
and (2) the relationship between television's use of visual
materials and its reporting of the major points of informa"
tion of the same story*
14
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Collapsing the data in Appendix I into percentages
of events reported (Table 1) shows The Mew York Ximsa with
a high of 87 per cent* reporting 78 of the 90 selected
events on the front page or the jump page continuance. The
Washington Poet reported 85 per cent. The Chicago l£JLtiuXk&*
with the crisis on the front page 24 of the 26 days*
reported 77 per cent of the selected events. The combined
average of the three newspapers shows 83 per cent of the
events reported on the front page.
MBC-TV reported 80 per cent (Table 1) of the 90
selected events on 22 half"hour evening newscasts. CBS-*TV«
with 18 programs of 30 minutes each* reported 61 per cent
of the standard. ABC~TV* offering a 15-minute newscast
seven nights a week* also reported 61 per cent of the 76
events occurring over the 22 days that ABC records were
available. The combined average of the three networks
shows 68 per cent of the selected events reported on the
early evening newscasts.
There is almost no difference between the percentage
of events reported by the Xiofiji and the fafljL. While the
77 per cent reporting figure of the Tribi^na is slightly
lower than that of the other newspapers* the combined
reporting average of 33 per cent indicates a high degree of
consensus of news judgments.
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in their coverage. MBC^s high of 80 per cent compared
favorably to the reporting percentages of the three news-
papers. (Table 1} However, when compared with the 61 per
cent reporting averages of the other two networks* NBC's
percentage is considerably higher.
h sizable difference appears in the comparison of
the average per cent of events reported on the front page
(83%) versus the average per cent reported on network
evening newscasts (68%)
.
TftlgyjgiQn'i tfae. of Yiaual Matflriala
The networks' records were researched for the amount
of film and video tape recordings concerning the Dc»tiinican
crisis used in each program. The basis for measurement was
total length of time* in minutes and seconds* of visual
materials directly related in content to the Dominican
crisis.
ABC used a total of 25 minutes and 46 seconds (25s 46)
of visuals in 19 of its 22 neMaemstat NBC used a total of
52s 07 of visuals in 18 of 22 newscasts; while CBS used
48s 35 of visuals in 14 of IB newscasts.
There was little evidence of a visuals effect in ABC
newscasts. (Table 2) The 19 programs employing visual
materials were ranked in order of film usage proceeding
from the most to the least in terms of minutes and seconds.
They were then collapsed* for comparison purposes* into
high* medium* and low usage categories. The objective was
Vi
?f f$i






£U «ifl^ o:r ii^"^i '^i;jy¥'?
e ftwsatf >«*






\SSJi OF VISUAL MATERIALS BY NfiTWORK TELEVISION
AMD PSRCSMTAGS OF SSLECTBD EVENTS OF


















Itedium 5296 21 7 s59
Low 67% 21 6 t34
None 62% 13 3 ^*
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iUgh 73% 15 S 5tll
Medium 44% 16 5 3tl2
LOW 72% 14 4 ijlO
Nona 94% 15 4 *"""
High 65% 18 6 4s 22
Medium 90% 21 6 28 38
LOW 95% 21 6 ls35












to study the extent to which th« avents wore reported in
each category. There were 21 evenrs that occurred on the
days of the six newscasts of hi^h film usage, on the days
of the seven newscasts of mediuia film usage, and on the
days of the six newscasts of low film usage. The three
programs not es^loying visuals were on days when 13
selected events occurred!.
ABC*s overall reporting average was 61 per cent.
There is aliaost no difference between this figure aiv3 the
percentage of events reported on newscasts eagploying high
visual siaterial content {6290 and no visual materials
(62%) . The percentage of events reported (52%) when filn
usage was nediuis %#as someiiAiat lower than the percentage
(67%) when film usage was low.
The 14 CBS newscasts that employed film or VTR were
also ranked in order of usage* then collapsed into high*
BMdiun* and low usage categories* (Table 2)
The nuiflber of events that occurred on the days of
the CBS newscasts in each category was not as constant as
that of ABC. However* for the purpose of this study* the
difference was not considered relevant. On the dates of
the five programs employing a high amount of visuals* IS
selected events occurred* while on the dates of medivn
usage newscasts* 16 events occurred. The four low visual
usage programs trere aired on dates vAien a total of 14
events happened and* during the four program days when no
fl
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visuals wre eiRployed« 15 events occurred.
CBS* 8 overall reporting average was 61 per cent of
the 90 events selected as the standard. The nuniber of
events occurring on the days of broadcasts totaled 60. The
difference* 30 events* occurred on the four weekends that
CM had no newscasts scheduled. Only 43 per cent of these
i#ere reported.
The most striking reporting percentages of CBS were
the low of 44 per cent of events reported with medium
length of visuals employed and the high of 94 per cent when
no visuals were used. This strongly suggests that CBS
tended to give more complete coverage to the news when no
visual aids were used. The categories of high usage (73%
reported) and low usage (729C reported) were not considered
too far out of line when compared to the overall reporting
percentage of CBS.
mc employed some form of visual materials on the
0anlnlcan crisis In 18 of the 22 scheduled newscasts over
the 26-day period. (Table 2) Again the programs were
listed In a rank order of visual usage* then collapsed into
high* medium* and low usage categories. The nuinber of
events occurring in each category was fairly constant with
18 events on the dates of broadcast of the six programs of
high visual content* and 21 events on the dates of the six
iMWscasts of medium usage and the six newscasts of low
usage categories. On the dates of the four programs where
a.






visuals were jwt used* a maximum of 15 events occurred.
HBC's overall reporting average was 90 per cent of
the 90 events selectctd as the standard. Tha nuniber of
events occurring on the 22 broadcast days totaled 75. Tha
difference, 15 events* occurred on the four Sundays in the
26'-day period when MBC had no scheduled news programs. MBC
reported 73 per cent of these on Monday evening newscasts.
The reporting percentages of VSBC differ iMirkedly.
The suggestion that fewer events are covered when more
visuals are used is supported %irhen only the 18 newscasts
«m(Ploying visuals are considered. High visual usage
programs reported 65 per cent of the events* the mediuae
cat€igory reflected 90 per cent coverage of events* and
those programs using few visual aids reported 95 per cent
of the events.
The rising curve of percentage of events reported by
KBC versus a decrease in film and VTR used would logically
conclude with a high reporting percentage rate ii^hen no
visuals %irere employed. This was not the case. The
reporting percentage when no visuals were used was 60 per
cent. This can be considered a basis for refuting the
charge that MBC's use of visual materials has a negative
relationship to the extent that the network offers its
viewers coverage of a 'top-interest** news story.
There was no unanimity of specific dates among the
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highest use o£ visuals was on May 6« which in turn was
grouped in the low usage category of CBS, while the highest
usage program of CBS« May 19« was in the low usage category
of MBC.
Days of the week within each category were studied
and again there w^s no trend discernible anong the networks.
As an example* Wednesdays were the predoninant days of the
week in the high visuals categories of CBS and ABC* but
Fridays were predominant days in the same category for NBC
with no ffodnesday programs included at all«
The individual segments of film or VTR used by each
network were chocked to determine to what extent each
contributed to the coverage of the historical standard.
The films were not available i however* the description logs
and the scripts used ymxe attached as part of the record.
It was then decided* for purposes of this study* to
classify the segments of visual materials into two
categories s (1) those that directly pertained to the
developed standard* and (2) those that did not.
Table 3 shows that in the 19 newscasts where ABC
esfiloyed visual materials* there were 28 separate segments
originating mostly from the United Nations in Hew York*
from Washington* D. C* and from Santo Domingo. Of these*
MK were classified as not pertaining to the standard and
included political interviews* Peace Corps publicity* and
a•c
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•ditorial analysis of U. S. actions. Most of the segments
In this category that originated In Santo Domingo were
descriptive of a city at war« showing gun emplacements*
street fighting « and Interviews with young soldiers and
Marines*
Of the 10 remaining segments of ABC film (369()f only
four originated from Santo Domingo. Because of airline
disruptions and other delays In shipment* the news reported
by these four segments was delayed 24 to 96 hours.
CBS had 14 newscasts employing visuals comprised of
2€ separate segments. Of these* 17 pieces (65%) were
classified as not pertaining to the standard* and they
reported the same type of events described earlier. Of the
nine remaining segments {25%) * six originated from Santo
Bomlngo and reported selected events. These six segments
were also delayed In shipment from 24 to 96 hours; however*
Walter Cronklte reported three of the events on camera on
the day they occurred and then used the redundant portion
of film when It arrived.
MBC used 32 segments of film or VTR on 18 newscasts.
Eighteen segments (57%) were classified as not pertaining
to the standard and were concerned with many of the same
topics described earlier. Of the 14 remaining segments
(43%) * seven originated from Santo Domingo and were aired






The networks differed in their use of news film that
originated in Santo Domingo and was delayed in shipment to
Vaw York. CBS tended to be redundant by reporting news
events on the day they occurred and then airing the delayed
newsfilm when it arrived. The other two networks appeared
to delay reporting the event until the film arrived* even
if the delay %iras as much as 72 hours.
Pinally« the nunber of newscasts that reported all
thim events of the day* yet still employed visuals, is
considered pertinent to this study. KBC Ic^ the three
networks with ten newscasts that reported 100 per cent of
the events assisted by visuals 7 second was CBS with five




In the past t%R> decades* television has demonstrated
a jresMirkabXe e3^>ansion until today there are over 75
million receivers in the United States. Paralleling the
growth of the industry has been the growth and maturation
of television ii@«rs«
Studies cited earlier have indicated the grotiing
popularity of television news as a primary source of
information for a significant segment of the public
«
challenging the traditional role of the newspaper. Other
Studies have compared the credibility of the two media* the
total content of tlM news* aiKi# separately* content
analysis of each medium. However* little research has been
published %fhich addresses itself to the extent of coverage
given a major news event by television in relation to that
given by the printed media.
In addition* various leaders of the media have
accused television of failing to fully report major news in
deference to the use of visual materials. Again* little if
any research has been published to give evidence to support
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This study was addressed to these two basic
problems I (1) the relative extent of coverage given a
major news story by net%M>rk television and by the front
pages of inajor newspapers; and (2) the relationship between
the use of visual materials on television amd the extent of
coverage it gives a major news story.
Ttm method selected as an approach to the problems
was content amalysis of three major daily newspapers—^e
Mew York Xiofia* Washington £fi«jL* and Chicago Tribune-^and
the three network television evening newscasts* "The
selected event « for which a historical standard was
develoi>ed for use in conqparing the media* was the 1965
Dominican crisis.
8oBW of the defects recognised in the method
included (1) the lack of network consistency* in 1965* in
the length and frequency of newscasts offered each week.
(2) the lack of organized records maintained by ABC-TV, and
(3) the arbitrary selection of the events used as the
historical stazidard.
notwithstanding these deficiencies* however* certain
results presented by this study are considered significant
•nough to warrant replication using a different and more
rmamnt major news event as the comparison standard.
One conclusion drawn from the results obtained by
the content analysis of the three newspapers is that a
definite consensus of news judgment is indicated. The
I 4.
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slightly higher percentage of items carried by the Timgg
could be attributed to the conservative-headlined, eight*
column, minimum-photo format of that newspaper's front
page. In addition the Timp>g was represented on-scene in
Santo Domingo by a staff of two (sometimes three) corres-
pondents while the other two newspapers had one correspond-
ent each.
This consensus of news judgment displayed by the
newspapers is lacking among the television networks. The
main implication of these data is that the length of the
newscast is the prime factor in the extent to which a news
event is covered. Of lesser importance is the frequency of
newscasts offered each week. NBC, with six half-hour
programs per week, surpassed ABC in percentage of events
reported in its seven 15-minute programs per week. The
low overall average of events reported by CBS appears
related more to the lack of weekend newscasts than to the
content offered in the 30-rainute Walter Cronkite program.
The data support the arguments offered by television
n«wsmen for a minimum of a 30-minute network newscast seven
nights a week. (The three networks now offer this length
and frequency of newscast.)
A comparison of the broadcast and printed media in
the extent to which the Dominican crisis was reported
points to a definite superiority of the newspapers* front




















attiribut«d basically to the length of the lAC newscasts and
the frequency of those offered by CBS. There is one other
factor to be considered* however* in judging network
covera9e-"-the use of visual fiiaterials.
ABC enqployed the shortest length of visual
BUiterials* averaging slightly msre than one minute in the
19 prograiaos in vfhich film or VTR was used. This could be
considered obvious in that ABC*s 15-Jtiinute fonaat was half
that of the other nc^tworks. Rcwever* even a proportionate
coniparison shows ABC using slightly less visuals than NBC*
with an average of three minutes* and CB6« with an average
of three and a half minutes per half^hour program.
niere was no ai^parent relationship between the use
of visual roaterials by ABC and the extent of coverage given
the Dominican crisis. The overall percentage of events
reported (6190 is equal to the percentage reported in the
19 programs en^loying visuals (bl%) and to the 62 per cent
reporting average of the three prograsRS without visuals.
The flla length and nunft>er of segaients used by ABC
in each program were restricted by the 15--minttte timm
limitation of the newscast. However* the fact that only 36
per cent of the film employed contributed directly to
reporting the events of the standard is considered note-
worthy* since it implies the need for the news program's
anchorman* Peter Jennings or Bob Young* to report the major
events occurring that day.
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CBS*s "Walter Cronkite and the News" used more fllin
and video tape recordings per progrzun* both in length of
tine and points of origin* than either of the other network
newscasts* RcMirever« only 35 per cent of the segments of
film used contributed to reporting the 90 selected events.
Although not systematically analyzed* the author *8 iatpres*-
sion when performing the content analysis was that it
llppaared Cronkite gave a shorter introduction to the
visuals on newscasts in the high and n^dium visual usage
categories than to those in the low usage category. Thus*
in the high usage category* the various points of origin*
rather than the on'-caxnera reporter* succeeded in reporting
73 per cent of the standard. In the mediun usage category*
an average of more than three minutes of film per program*
Cronkite *s introductions still appeared to be brief and the
segments of film used had fewer points of origin. Thus*
coverage in this category reflected only 44 per cent of the
•elected events. As the use of visuals decreased* leaving
ore time for on-camera reporting* Cronkite appeared to
give longer introductions. For exaoq^le* on Nay 17* a
newscast* employing no visual materials* all events were
reported that occurred that day including two events that
were re-reported the following day When the film arrived
from Santo Domingo. The next newscast* May 18* was in the
high visual category and only 50 per cent of the events
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with the t%#o events reported 24 hours earlier. Only at CBS
did this redundancy of reporting occur. The other network
editors let the film report the news when it arrived, even
if it was delayed 72 hours enroute.
Considering his on-c2uaera reporting, it appeared
that with more time available, Cronkite reported more of
the day's eventsf thus the percentage of events reported
rose to a 72 per cent average in the low visuals category
and 94 per cent when no visuals were en^loyed.
To understand the results obtained from the analysis
of MBC, it is first necessary to isolate the 18 Huntley-
Brinkley newscasts from the four "Saturday Mews Index"
programs. As stated in Chapter 1X1, 13 MBC newscasts used
visuals. Of these, 17 were "The Huntley-Brinkley Report"
While three of the four newscasts that employed no visual
materials were offered on Saturdays. Turning to the
percentage of selected events reported without regard to
the use of visuals, Chet Huntley, normally the narrator for
the Dominican crisis news, averaged 85 per cent while the
four Saturday newscasts, employing a reduced staff, reported
only 66 per cent of the events that occurred.
In looking at the relationship between the use of
visuals and the coverage of events by MBC, the most notice-
able trend is the increasing percentage of events reported
as the length of visuals employed decreased. In contrast






Included as nany Iteiaa of importance in his script as tin*
would allow* letting the film segments stand on their own
or act as a supplssmnt. Of the 32 film segments employed
by NBC, th© 43 per cent that contributed to coverage of the
standard is a figure only slightly higher than the other
two networks.
As less visuals were used by KBC* more of the daily
events were reported until reaching tha no-visual-usage-
reporting percentage (6094) . An explanatjuon 2»ay be related
to the fact that three of the four newscasts in this
category were progranaisd on Saturday.
In suimnary* evidence has been introduced that bears
on the two problaoMi stated in Chapter I. First* on the
average # a front page of a major daily newspaper in 1965
offered its reader a greater percentage of the iteiss of
importance within a major international news story than did
the evening network television newscasts. Studying the
television networks individually* the evidence strongly
suggests the need fbr a minimum half-hour newscast seven
nights a week* since the lowest reporting net%^rks had as
possible drawbacks less frequent (CBS) or shorter (ABC)
newscasts than HBC.
Second* a negative relationship is indicated between
the use of visual materials and the coverage of news events








More ifi^portant* however* is the inqplied role of
visual materials suggested by the evidence. Does television
news use visual materials to report the aajor developments
o£ a news story or are such materials more supplementary in
content? The evidence introduced (Table 3) categorises
57*-65 per cent of the film segments einployed by the networks
as non-contributory to the coverage of the selected
standard. Obviously the events selected for the standard
were not the only ma^or daily events. However* in content*
this non-contributory film was for the most part only
tangential to loajor events* regardless of selection
criteria.
Tha iiqplications left by this study deserve closer
attention by other researchers through replication*
especially in view of today's e^q^^anded news coverage by the
three networks. Also of interest would be a study of the
redundancy of the news reported when film is delayed in
shipment such as the delays incurred in the arrival of
filmed reports from Vietnam. Are the events of a neirs
story reported on-oamera on tha day they occur or are the
reports delayed until the film arrives? In news stories
involving military actions* does the film contribute to the
development of the story or is it ''excitement ** film used
only for the film's sake? As the role of television news




















WORIUBISSTS AMD 90 MAJOR ITEMS OF IKTBRSilT
Date I Saturday. April 24 « 196S
Major Xteiaa of Interests
A. Military coup attaaiptad in Santo Dooingo
B. Coi;^ aponaored by supporters of Juan Bosch
C. Rttid declares coup suppressed
D. Brief Doiainican history since Bosch overthrow in 1963
Iteaui Media
Times Post Tribune* ABC-'n' HBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X — X X K
• XX — JS X X
C X X — X X —
D XX — —
Tine consumed
by TV visuals
*Usod on inside pages
Oatet Sunday^ April 25* 1965
Major Items of Interest!
A. Oovernment of Donald Raid Cabral toppled by military
coup
B. New junta splits ovsr return of Bosch
C* Jose Rafael Molina Urena proclaimed acting President
by pro-Bosch faction
O. Pro and anti-Bosch leaders identified
fi. Dominican Air Force planes strafe city
Itens Media
Tines Post Tribune ABC-TV MBC-TV CBS-TV
A XXX —
B X X X X X —
€
— X X —
9 X X X X X X
B — X X X X X
Ti»e consumed
hy TV visuals
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Dates Monday, April 26, 1965
Major Zteros of Interests
A. U. S. decision to evacuate U. S. nationals from Santo
D^aaingo
B. Rebels (pro'-Bosch faction) distribute arms to
citizens
C. Further strafing of city by Dcmiinican aircraft
D. U. S. Navy sunphibious task force* with embarked
Marines* standing by
Items _ Media
Tines Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
h X X X X — —
B X X X — X X
C X X JC 31 X X
D X X X X — X
Tixe consumed
by TV visuals s40
Dates Tuesday, April 27, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Dominican revolt fails as pro-Bosch leaders surrender
B. U. 8. Mavy evacuates U. S. citizens
C. Interim junta to be formed by loyalist military
D. Recap of rebellion
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X X X X X
B X X X X X X
e X X X — X X
D X X X — X X
Time consumed
by TV visuals s40 s28 Is 00
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Dates Wednesday* April 28, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Rebels reorganiase and hold dovmtovrn Santo Domingo
B. 400 U. S. Marines land in Santo Domingo
C. Council of the Organization of American States (GAS)
convenes in Washington* D. C.
D. President Johnson addresses U. S. public via radio
































Dates Thursday, April 29* 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. 2*500 U. S. Army troops land in Santo Domingo
B. Rebels fire on U. S. Embassy
C. GAS resolution passed calling for cease-fire and
establishment of a security zone
D. First indication of Communist activity in rebel
forces
Items Media
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Datet Friday, April 30, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Cease-fire agreement signed in Santo Domingo
B. Cease-fire agreement ignored by rebel faction
C. First U. S. casualties reported
D. President Johnson's second address to U, S. public
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV* NBC-TV CBS-TV
A XXX X ~
B X —
C XXX X —
D XX
Time consumed
by TV visuals 3:34 2:55
*Records not available
Datei Saturday, May 1, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. 2,000 more U. S. troops sent to Santo Domingo
B. OAS sends five-man peace mission to Santo Domingo
C. Marines secure International Safety Zone (ISZ) in
Santo Domingo
D. President Johnson stresses humanitarian aspects of
U. S. intervention
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV* NBC-TV CBS-TV
A XXX XX
B X
C XXX X —
D — X
Tima consumed
by TV visuals 2j30





























Dates Sunday* May 2, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. President Johnson charges Communist control
B. Last of U. S. troop buildup moves into Santo Domingo
C. OAS team establishes second cease** fire agreement
D. Special Presidential envoy, John B. Martin, arrives
in Santo DcMsiingo
Items Media
TiMmm Post Tribune ABC-TV* NBC-TV CBS-TV
A XXX x X
U X —
€ XXX X —
Time consumed
by TV visuals Q
Records not available
Dates Monday. May 3« 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. OAS Inter-American Peace Force sought by U. S,
B. USSR charges U. S. of charter violation in UN Security
Council
C. President Johnson restates Communist charges and
calls for effective peace prior to U. S. withdrawal
D. Supply corridor link-up effected by Marines and Army
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X — — X — ^»
» « X X X X X
C X X X X X —
D X X X X X X
Time consumed
by TV visuals 2s 17 2s22 3s 35























Dates Tuesday* Hay 4* 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Rebels name Col. Caamano as "Constitutional
President
"
B. I8Z expanded £our blocks by Marines
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X X JC X X
B X — X — —
Time consiuned
by TV visuals It 00 5s 29 58 40
Dates Wednesday, May 5« 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. GAS approves lAPP
B. Another cease-fire agreed to by all factions
€• U. S. releases names of 58 alleged Conanunists
involved in rebel cause
D. U. S. Marine captured by rebels
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
h X X X X X X
• X X X X X X
e X X X — X X
e X X X X X X
Time consumed
by TV visuals 2s45 2s51 4s 10
MOTEs **X** indicates it«n reported
7*?\A
A. 1-. J-. •> -X
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Dates Thursday* May 6* 1965
Major Items of Interest
i
A. Four Marines killed in rebel area when medical
convoy makes wrong turn
B. Two U. S. news correspondents wounded by Marines at
Santo Domingo checkpoint
C. Bosch (from San Juan) charges U. S. complicity in
loyalist air attacks on Santo D<Mningo
Items Media
TiMS Post Tribune ABC-TV KBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X X X X X
B X X X X X X
C X m^ — ••• m^ —
Time consumed
by TV visuals 2t53 5i37 2810
Datet Friday, May 7, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Five-man civilian-military loyalist junta headed by
Brig. Gen. Imbert replaces three-nan junta
B. OAS advances plan of three-man OAS trusteeship
C. OAS hears report from returned five-man peace mission
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
k X X X X X —
1 XX — XX —
C U X — — — —
Tine consumed
by TV visuals Is 00 3s 52 2s 00
NOTES "X" indicates item reported
11^
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APP£liB)IX I (continued)
Date I Saturday, iiay 8, 1965
Major Itema of Intereat
t
A. Rebels charge new loyaliat junta illegal
B* With ceaae-fire in effect* one Marine killed and
three Army troops wounded
C. Two hundred rebels surrender weapons
D. U. S. escpreaaes opposition to both far right and far
left governments for Dcnninican Republic and hope for
0AM taking active role in new government formation
Itema Media
Timas Post Tribune ABC-TV BC-TV CBS-TV
A Ji X X — X X
B X X -— X X X
e .«. —
-
X ... OHM ..
D X — — X X ——
Time conauroed
by TV viauala s31
Datet Sunday. May 9« 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Irobert dismisses eight loyalist officers aa
conciliatory move
B* Three Navy man captured by rebela
C. Marines deploy 105 ma, howitsers aimad at city
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
h X X X X — —
B — X X — X
C X — ~ — — X
Time consumed
by TV visuala i49
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APPEKDIX Z (continued)
Dates Monday, May 10, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Brig. Gen. Wessin agrees to resign and depart
Dominican Republic
B. Wessin retracts resignation decision
C. OhM votes to extend mandate of Peace CcHnmission
Items Media
Times Post Tribune A3C-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X X X X K
B X X X X — X
C XX — — —
Time consumed
by TV visuals s53 3t52 3t50
Dates Tuesday, May 11« 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Presidential envoy Martin meets with Caamano
B. U« S. now advocates coalition government
C. U. 8. opposes UH resolution as prejudiced to 0A8
authority
Items Media
Tinas Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X — X X X X
S X — — — X
C — X — — X X
Time consumed
by TV visuals Is 12 2sll 4s20
























Date: Wednesday* May 12 « 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. OAS votes to postpone Ministers* Conference in
Rio de Janerio* Dominican crisis given as reason
B. OAS mediators meet with both factions in Santo
Domingo for settlement negotiation
C. U. S. Smbassy registers official complaint with
rebels on cease-fire violations
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A — X —
B X X X X X
C X — X — X
Time consumed
by TV visuals 2j33 3i11 5s 15
Dates Thursday* May 13« 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. Legalist aircraft strafe rebel-held Radio Santo
D<»)ingo
B. Wild shots from strafing aircraft hit near U. S.
Embassy
C. Major loyalist/rebel clash in north sector of city
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV BIBC-TV CBS-TV
h X X X X X X
M X X X X X X
C X — X — X X
Time consumed
by TV visuals :30 2s06
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APPENDIX I (continued)
Date: Friday, May 14, 1965
Major Items of Interest
j
A. UN dispatches fact*£inding mission to Santo Domingo
B. Loyalist ground forces launch all-out attack on Radio
Santo Domingo
C. Honduran troops arrive as first augmentation of lAPF
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X — X X X
B X — X X X —
C -- — X X X —
Time consumed
by TV visuals t 30 3t45 2j30
Dates Saturday, May 15, 1965
Major Items of Interest:
A. Loyalist/rebel clash in northern sector of city grows
to major proportions
B. OAS issues official call to both sides to restore
truce
C. Pacifist groups present demand in Washington for
U. S. withdrawal
Items Media
Times Post Tribune* ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
h XX XXX
H X — — »* — —
Time consumed
by TV visuals t32
NOTE: "X" indicates item reported
• Used on inside payes
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Date: Sunday, May 16, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. McGeorge Bundy and Thomas Mann arrive in Santo
Domingo as part of a four«-i»an Presidential peace team
B. iRibert urged to resign by U. S. and refuses
C. Heavy fighting continues with rebel charges of U. S,
assistance to loyalists
Items Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV HBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X X X X X
B m X X —
'
X ——
e X X X X X X
Viae consumed
by TV visuals Is 01
Dates Monday, May 17, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A« U. S. negotiators and Caamano agree on Guzman as
coalition leader
B. Imbert opposes Guzman and again refuses to resign
C. U. S. offers ccMnmand of U. S. forces in Dominican
Republic to 0A8 as part of lAPF
D. Imbert defies OAS plea for cease-fire in north sector
of city
Xtams Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X X X X X
» u X X — X X
e X X X — X X
— X X — X X
Time consumed
by TV visuals s56 2s56
MOTBi "X" indicates item reported
.A
't'-^'S ^^* » '«^-'* '"•''- "'•*':Ii« - <;.•.-. T".. s;i i^











y. X "X. --- ^i
X X — X X.
> X — X




Datet Tuesday* May 18« 1965
Major Items of Interests
A. OAS told U. S, favors broad-based civilian-controlled
coalition
B. UN cease-fire plan reconunended* rebels accept, Inibert
opposes
Items Media












Dates Wednesday, May 19, 1965
Major Items of Interests
A* OAS peace commission charges UN committee with
obstructing attempts for peace
B. Imbert forces win major victory in north sector
fighting
C. Both factions agree to UI7~sponsored truce
Itams Media
Times Post Tribune ABC-TV NBC-TV CBS-TV
A X X X — X X
B X X X X X X
C X X X X X X
Time consumed
by TV visuals Is 19 Is 35 6s 30
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APPSMDIX II
CHROIIOLOGy OF MAJOR EVSHTS IS CTB
DOMZMXCAM RSPUBLXC CRISIS
What factors contributed to the political upheaval
of a country designed to be a "showcase of democracy"?
The Dominican Republic survived 31 years under a merciless
dictatorship only to pass through four changes of govern-
want in the four-year period follo»#ing the dictator's
assassination. Qeneralissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo
Molina vas assassinated in May 1961 and his family forced
to l€Mve soon thereafter. By 1962 « under their naif
democratic election system* the citizens of the Dominican
Republic elected Or. Juan Bosch as President. Anticipating
lanadiate stability* the people of this potentially wealthy
country were soon disappointed. Ruiaors of growing
OOMsanist influences on their poet-novelist President
further agitated the situation. After nine months as
President* Dr. Bosch was r^aoved by the lailitary hierarchy
and replaced by a civilian triumvirate. The meisbership of
the triumvirate changed constantly but in 1964 one figure
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appeared to dominate/ Donald Reid Cabral. Reid^ an
experienced economist/ attempted to bring stability to his
country through a financial austerity program and agrarian
development. Given time, the program might have succeeded
but time was running out.
A second factor to consider is the military, many of
whom were holdovers from the Trujillo regime. Some of the
senior colonels and generals resented Reid for curtailing
certain unwarranted special privileges they had enjoyed and
for attempting to end the Trujillo-inspired traditional
2
corruption of the Dominican armed services. The junior
officers* who perhaps only tacitly accepted the overthrow
of Juan Bosch, now entertained second thoughts on the
political course of their country. This led to conspiracies
to return the deposed President.
Add to this ferment a nine-month drought in Santo
Domingo, a city of nearly 400,000 people, and you have the
situation that existed on April 24, 1965.
It was a Saturday and in the late morning a small
commercial radio station broadcast a bulletin announcing a
revolution and the overthrow of President Donald Reid
Cabral. That first announcement was inaccurate and
premature but within hours civilian and military rebels
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television station* and announced not only the downfall of
the Reid regime but their intention to return Dr. Juan
Bosch to power. In addition to Radio Santo Domingo » the
Bosch supporters seized two military bases on the outskirts
of the city. Loyalist forces* however, easily recaptured
the radio station and President Reid gave an ultimatum to
th« two bases to surrender by 5i00 p.m. that day. Although
the 5i00 p.m. deadline was ignored by the rebels* Reid felt
confident enough by lOjOO p.m. to announce from the Palace
that the situation was under control and the coup
suppressed. During the night* however* loyalist and rebel
military leaders met and decided the time had come for th«
ouster of President Reid and a decision was reached to
establish a temporary military junta with new elections to
be scheduled in six to nine months.
Faced with this fait accompli by his own armed
services* Donald Reid Cabral resigned as President about
lOtOO a.m. Sunday* April 25. The situation changed again
when the younger military officers who had instigated the
revolt the previous day occupied the Presidential Palace.
Instead of a military junta* they announced their original
intention of restoring Dr. Bosch* who was now living in
exile in San Juan# Puerto Rico. This swift move led to
an instant split within the military* with the loyalist
generals furious over what they considered a betrayal.
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Soon specific leaders began to emerge on both sides.
Dominating the movement to restore Juan Bosch were two
young Army lieutenant colonels, Miguel Angel Hernando
Ramirez and Francisco Caamano Deno. Their first act was to
swear in a former Bosch cabinet member* Jose Rafael Molina
Urena* as Provisional President awaiting the return of Dr.
Bosch. Bosch* in San Juan« was anxiously awaiting the
arrival of a Dcxninican aircraft to return him to Santo
Dconingo.
The loyalist forces were led by Air Force Brigadier
General Elias Wessen y Wessin* the commander of San Isidro
Air Base* backed by General Atila Luna of the Army.
Reacting swiftly to the developments at the Presidential
Palace* Wessin launched his limited force of fighter-
bombers* four of which strafed and fired rockets at the
Palace,where Molina and his command were established. The
remainder* without apparent missions* crisscrossed the city
strafing and bombing suspected rebel areas and the civilian
population in general.
Anticipating further provocations by Wessin's forces*
both by land and air* the rebel military opened the doors
of arms repositories ar^ overnight distributed weapons to
an estimated 20*000 pro-Bosch civilians in Santo Domingo.
Reports also stated that the city's filling stations gave
3
anray free gasoline for anti-tank Molotov cocktails.
3
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At that point, certain conclusions were being
reached at the United States Embassy. Convinced that,
while in office, Juan Bosch had been soft on Conmiunists,
the Embassy sensed that the intervening years had not
changed this attitude. This was especially true for the
military attaches at the Embassy, who said Bosch's return
4
would mean "Communism in six months." In addition,
individuals known to be Communistic-trained were believed
to be deeply involved in the rebel orders to arm civilians.
Painted signs appeared downtown saying "Weapons for the
People" and signed "P.S.P.," initials for the Communist'led
Socialist Popular Party. Captured tanks and vehicles drove
through the city with the one word "Pueblo"—the people-
painted on their sides. Added to this assumption of an
impending Communist takeover was the fact that without
United States support the outcome of General Wessin*s
efforts to overcome the pro-Bosch rebellion was in grave
doubt. These two factors, coupled with the United States
national objective of protecting American citizens and
interests, played a major role in all subsequent United
States decisions.
Washington officials who, up to then, had believed
the rebellion to be suppressed, were alerted by the Embassy
^Ihi^'» p. 19.
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of both the proximity of danger to American lives and to
"leftist" takeover of the revolution. Reacting to this
implied threat, contingency plans for the Caribbean were
readied for activation. Defense Department planning for
such contingencies calls for the Navy to maintain an
amphibious squadron of six ships with a reinforced
battalion of 1,800 Marines embarked, continuously on alert
in the Caribbean area. Acting independently, the Navy had
sailed this alert force from San Juan to the immediate area
of Santo Domingo at the first sign of unrest on April 24.
Led by the helicopter carrier, USS Boxer, the task force
arrived "on station, " over-the-horizon from Santo Domingo,
by the following evening. So far this was normal routine
for the "Carib Ready PhibRon" but on Monday* April 26, the
Department of Defense further alerted a Marine Corps
Brigade at Camp Lejeune, the Army's 82nd Airborne Division
at Fort Bragg, and other selected ships of the United
States Atlantic Fleet.
Monday's activity in Santo Domingo centered around
General Wessin's P-51 fighters strafing city streets plus
further fighter-bomber attacks on the Palace and Radio
Santo DcMningo, site of inflammatory rebel broadcasts.
Opposing the aircraft attacks were armed rebel military and
civilians %«ho alternated firing their weapons and ducking
Roland Evans and Robert Novak, L^jo^OJi R* Johnson t
Th& ExS£Sls^ Ql JBjQSaLSX* pp. 513-514.
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for cover. Although not directly attacking United States
property, the armed rnobs incited by the radio and television
broadcasts looted and burned homes of the ousted Reid
regime
•
In Washington the tenseness of the situation coupled
with the possibility of a Communist takeover presented
President Johnson with alternate plans of action. First
was immediate voluntary evacuation of United States
citizens from the capital and, second, armed intervention
to restore law and order. The President decided that day
to implement the first choice immediately, holding the
second course of action in reserve.
Acting under orders, the ships of the alerted
Amphibious Squadron closed Santo Domingo and the seaport of
Haina and on Tuesday morning, April 27, began embarking
1,172 United States citizens by helicopter and boat.
Although Marines went ashore in Santo Domingo at this time,
they were members of unarmed communications teams.
By late afternoon on Tuesday, with Wessin*s land
forces advancing steadily from the east, continued strafing
and bombing of the city by the Air Force and the arrival to
the west of a loyalist Army regiment from San Cristobal,
the scales appeared to be tipping against the rebels.
Added to the rebel feeling of despair was the decision on
the part of Commodore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero,
commander of the Dominican Navy, to give his support to the
r.
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Wessin forces. The small ships# as a token participation,
lobbed three shells into the city in the general direction
of the Presidential Palace, where acting President Molina
was headquartered.
The Dominican Navy's decision to support the
loyalist forces must have been crucial to the rebel plans^
for shortly after 5:00 p.m. a group of rebel military and
civilian leaders, led by acting President Molina and
Colonels Hernando and Caamano, arrived at the United States
Embassy, having already requested assistance from the
Anibassador in mediating negotiations with General Wessin*
Accounts of the visit are vague, inconclusive, and
conflicting; however, at the conclusion Mr. Molina departed
for the Columbian Embassy, where he requested and received
political asylum. Although no agreement was reached, it
7
appeared that the rebellion had collapsed.
By the following day, Wednesday, all rebel leaders
except Colonel Caamano had gone into asylum at foreign
embassies, but, surprisingly, the armed civilians and
military downtown continued fighting. To fill the power
vacuum at the top. Colonel Caamano had returned to rebel
headquarters to reorganize the forces and, if possible,
instill new spirit in the movement.
How they reorganized and where they derived their
7Szulc, op . ciL. , p. 34.
c.e.










5fjp ^.. . r:-^, rr-..;r.r:
.'J J J (C \ ^xi*CiXi.r-ii«3
'jt oi-^ c « r^ n r^B ^r
i
£»ns a \ .?£*=;:: tSta:
*^:«f.;r: ff-nC'D'^ V
;q 2X vi>fifi at'D^O^ -^ <:^^ Sit:/-:SiSnp' fyn
56
will to win is still unknown but by Wednesday morning it
was accomplished. To Embassy observers, it was reported
that the rebel forces had been organized by the Communist-
controlled political parties of the Dominican Republic,
with Caamano remaining the rebel leader. They consolidated
the downtown business area, emplacing automatic weapons on
roof tops. With minor exceptions, all of downtown Santo
Domingo was under rebel control, including all utilities,
the telephone exchange, the banks, and the power plant.
This reorganization of rebel forces, with Communist
attribution, was reported to Washington by the Ambassador.
In mid-afternoon. Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit, the
recently chosen loyalist-junta President, officially
requested United States intervention "for assistance in
Q
restoring order. * The request, coupled with the
Ambassador's stated doubts as to his ability to safeguard
United States citizens and property, prompted immediate
action from President Johnson. At the time the cable
arrived, the President was in meeting with members of the
National Security Council. His decision was to land 400
Harines immediately "to give protection to hundreds of
Americans . . . and to escort them safely back to this
9
country. " Simultaneously the Councxl of the Organization
1965, p. 738.
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of American States was urgently convened and briefed on
both the situation and the United States reaction to it.
At the request of the United States a full OAS Council
meeting was scheduled for Friday morning, April 30.
As the Marines were landing. Ambassador Bennett,
convinced of the deteriorating situation and the possibility
of "another Cuba" in this hemisphere, was recommending even
stronger action. Once ashore, the Marines realized the
immediacy of war when those assigned to protect the
Embassy were fired on by snipers.
Thursday morning, April 29, the remaining 1, 300
Marines of the Amphibious Squadron came ashore. By night-
fall the Marines were augmented by two battalions of the
32nd Airborne Division, totaling 2,500 paratroopers.
In Washington, the United States Ambassador to the
OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, addressed a meeting of the council
stressing the danger to not only American citizens but to
all foreign citizens in Santo Domingo. He said, "We are
not now talking aibout intruding into the domestic affairs
of other countries" but "about the elementary duty to save
lives in a situation where there is no authority able to
accept responsibility for primary law and order." He
pressed the OAS for a vote on an appeal for an immediate
^^Ibid .. p. 740.
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cease-fire and reassured the council that the United States
would remain neutral/ leaving the choice of candidate for a
new Dominican government to the Dominicans. The result was
an OAS resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and
the establishment of an international security zone in
which all foreign nationals could find protection. United
States policy was to be a combination of hemispheric
diplomacy and military show of strength to force a cease-
fire.
Under the provisions of the OAS resolution* the
Marines went into action Friday morning securing the
western residential area of the city as the International
Security 55one (ISZ) . The first United States fatality was
a Marine hit by fire from a sniper near the IS 3. The
airborne soldiers* who had landed at San Isidro to the
east/ took over from, the buckling loyalist forces and
pushed their way to the Ozama River, incurring four wounded
casualties in the bitter fighting with rebel army units.
The first of many cease-fires was being negotiated
in the midst of fighting with Monsignor Clarizio* the Papal
Nuncio* and Ambassador Bennett acting as go-betweens.
Their task received impetus with the arrival of President
Johnson's personal emissary* former Dominican Ambassador
John Bartlow Martin. By late afternoon, forty-eight hours
after the first Marine landing* General Wessin and the
loyalist junta signed the truce document with a rebel
t£
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representative initialing it for Colonel Caamano.
Even as President Johnson hailed the cease-fire
acceptance in a nationally televised speech that evening
from Washington, it was obvious to those in Santo Domingo
that the firing had not stopped and that the truce, as
such, was not to be observed. Also contained in the
President's speech, however, was the request for the OAS to
assume some of the responsibility for Dominican events. In
response to the Presidential request, the OAS Secretary
General, Jose A. Mora, left Washington for Santo Domingo,
establishing the first OAS presence in the battle-torn
city.
May Day, Saturday, showed little adherence to the
cease-fire agreement, and at San Isidro two thousand more
Airborne troops arrived from Ft. Bragg. But more than
troops arrived that day. The OAS Council, having dispatched
Secretary General Mora the previous day, followed up by
sending a five-man peace commission to Santo Domingo in an
attempt to find the formula needed to restore law and
order.
The Dominican problem was rapidly becoming an inter-
national crisis with charges of United States intervention
and countercharges of Communist domination. In the days to
follow the Dominican crisis became the focal point in the
United Nations, with the Soviet delegate forcing the issue
of intervention? in the National Security Council, with the
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threat of another Caribbean Communist coup still a
possibility; and in the OAS Council ,where the United States
was strongly recommending the creation of an Inter-American
Peace Force (lAPF) to bring about stability to the
situation.
The internal political situation in Santo Domingo
also had its fluctuations, with Caamano accepting the title
of President within the rebel faction and a five-man
civilian-military junta, headed by Brigadier General
Antonio Imbert, replacing the loyalists* three-man military
junta. Both factions claimed total support from the
provinces. Imbert « for political as well as conciliatory
reasons, agreed to dismiss eight of the more objectionable
loyalist officers. This was unacceptable to the rebels,
however, since their primary foe, Wessin, was not among the
eight.
In the days to follow, sniping within the city
continued despite two more cease-fire agreements. On
Hay 13, all pretense at peaceful negotiations was scrapped
when the loyalist forces launched an all-out drive in the
northern sector of the city determined to erase rebel
opposition. As the gunfire in the north gained in
intensity, two major political events occurred the next
day. May 14. In the United Nations, Secretary General
U Thant dispatched a personal representative to Santo
Domingo carrying a unanimous resolution calling for a
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strict ceaae-fire. In addition* t^^ aircraft landed at 8an
Isidro carrying 130 Honduras troops and 20 Costa &icmn
military policesi@n» the first contingent of the politically
si9nificant Intar-Aifl««xican ieaca Force of tha OAli,
Haa-^/y fighting becwaen tho loyalists and rebels
continued for the better part of the following week while
conciliatory efforts becane zoore confused • Accing
independently* the OAS and Qhited 2itations p^Li^ace o<Marais3ions
were makiiig little headway and on May lb they were joined
by s four-^'xaan taeun appointed by Freaident Johnson and
hesidftfd by McGeorge Bundy. The Bundy group's ndj»sion was to
patch together a noderate* broad^based coalition governzaent
acceptable to both sides. The candidate selected to head
this governotent was a wealthy* conservative* ex-minister of
the Sosch regxxne* Silvestro Antonxo G'o^maii. The Ous^aan
formula failed because of IxBbert*s refusal to resign. In
addition* iBibert defied calls for a cease-fire wl>en it
became obvious to hiis that his forces were wimiing in the
city's northern sector fighting. On Hay 18 the Caamano
forces recreated behind che IS2;* thus forming an enclave
protected on all sides by the aewly formed IA?F.
A third cease-- fire plan* sponsored by the United
Mations and OAB delegates aided by the Red Cross* was
agreed to by all concerned on May 19 and went into effect
Qn May 21. AlttK>ugh the agreement was for only a 24-hour











the political situation as the only remaining thorn.
Three months elapsed before the creation* on
September 3* of an interxB provisional govemiaent under
Sector Garcia-Oodoy* a Doninican career diplomat* and* like
GaoBan* a fomer Minister in the Bosch cabinet. Tha
solution, arrived at by the OAC coRoission* «fas from the
beginning acceptable to Caantano. It^tmrt at first refused
to retreat from his intention of wiimiiig an unconditional
surrender txom the rebel faction but* When faced with OhB
determination to prevent his forces from crossing the 182*
addsd to strong economic pressures from the United States*
he agreed to accept the provisional regine.
Dr. Garcia-Godoy*s primary misaion as Provisional
President was to pr<»pare his nation for open and free
elections to be held within six to nine aionths. This was
accoBf>lished and on June X* 1966* sone X3 nonths after that
first broadcast* Juan Bosch was defeated for President in a
landslide victory by Joaquin Balaguer* a snoderate rightist.
Balaguer's victory* and Bosch's acceptance of it* <^pened
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